a16z's 14 charts make the case that AI investment isn't a bubble

Along the way, they debunk three widely misread metrics: the falling token chart, the six-month order backlog, and that 5% entry-level job stat.

By a16z08-01 · 12 min read⚑ Expert view · personal take
Deep Dive · by Xiaohu
The 60-second take
  • Vertiv, which makes data center cooling and power gear, fell $76 million short of its delivery targets. That got spun as a sign of an AI bust, so a16z checked public data against that narrative three ways.
  • Their conclusion: demand is unusually high, but the data can't say whether supply chains are also straining. Along the way, they unpack three widely misread numbers.
  • One of those — the viral "AI demand is collapsing" curve — isn't actually measuring demand at all.
⚑ This piece draws from a16z's weekly data column, Charts of the Week (July 31, 2026, by Moses Sternstein). The raw data for the 14 charts comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, the New York Fed, Indeed Hiring Lab, ADP Research, SiliconData, YipitData, Kalshi, and Capital IQ / LSEG Datastream / Yardeni Research. ⚠️ a16z is an investor with a stake in this space, and this entire issue argues that AI infrastructure demand hasn't cooled. It also flags three limitations in its captions: the numbers on two GPU charts were visually reconstructed by a16z from others' published charts; OpenRouter's spending data covers only a slice of overall demand and skews toward U.S. SMBs; and the backlog ratio and unfilled orders are two different statistical measures. This article also flags five spots where the text disagrees with its own charts; I go with the charts and note each one.
Infrastructure

AI compute and hardware demand is red-hot, but supply chains are strained

a16z (Andreessen Horowitz) just published a new issue of Charts of the Week, its weekly data column, with 14 charts, all drawn from public data. The process is the interesting part. Everyone's arguing about whether AI is a bubble, and most arguments rest on stock prices and vibes. This issue instead walks through Census Bureau, NY Fed, Indeed, and ADP numbers to check three specific questions: Is AI infrastructure demand fading? Are entry-level jobs being killed by AI? Is real corporate AI spending shrinking? Where the data runs out, it says so plainly.

A data-center cooling company just missed its shipments

Vertiv supplies cooling and power gear for data centers and has been one of the big winners in this build-out. Its Q2 2026 revenue came in at $3.27 billion, up 24% year over year.

But it missed its own guidance by about $76 million this quarter, and missed the Street's higher consensus by about $120 million. The $76 million gap is roughly 12% of its year-over-year increase of $630 million (that math is ours).

Management's explanation was "minor timing shifts" — temporary supply chain congestion, plus multi-phase project execution getting more complex as deployments scale. In other words: the orders are there; the gear just didn't ship on time.

Vertiv quarterly revenue from Q1 2023 to Q2 2026
Vertiv's quarterly revenue rose from $1.52 billion in Q1 2023 to $3.27 billion in Q2 2026, more than doubling in just over three years. The +24% marked on the chart is year-over-year growth. Data from Capital IQ, GAAP total revenue. ⚠️ The English phrase "added a substantial $3.27B in revenue" is easy to misread as "revenue increased by $3.27B"; per the chart's own title, "Vertiv Quarterly Revenue," $3.27B is the quarterly total, and the actual increase is $630M.

If Vertiv is hitting supply chain issues, others likely are too. Do those show up elsewhere? Three leads to chase.

Vertiv short by $76M Lead 1: Machinery ordersWho's ordering Lead 2: Backlog ratioHow long to clear Lead 3: Physical importsIs less arriving AC orders doubled in a decade;material handling spiked, then fell Takes ~6 months to clear — high,but flat since 2024 Unit counts haven't fallen;same goods just cost ~20% more Together: demand is unusually strong and outpacing supply; whether supply chains added friction, none of these three can say
Our diagram of this section's verification chain, following the order of the original post. Each lead is unpacked below.

AC orders doubled in a decade; material handling on the same chart spiked and fell back

The first lead is orders. The Census Bureau tracks manufacturing orders by category, and among the data center–adjacent categories, air conditioning stands out the most.

U.S. machinery orders, 2000 to 2026, four series
U.S. machinery orders, 2000–2026. Ventilation, heating, AC, and refrigeration (blue) rose from roughly 3.8 in 2016–2020 to about 7.1 now; turbines, generators, and power distribution (green) around 5.3; mining and oil & gas field equipment (orange) around 4.8; material handling (red) is around 2.85 now, was about 2.4 in 2016 and peaked near 3.7 in 2023. ⚠️ The y-axis units aren't labeled on the chart, so only relative changes can be described. Data from LSEG Datastream and Yardeni Research.

The AC category doubled (turbines, generators, and power distribution rose about 30% over the same stretch — no doubling). That's not hard to explain: high-performance computing is basically turning electricity into heat. More machines, more heat, tighter supply for cooling gear. Generation and distribution rising with it follows the same logic.

There's a fourth line on the chart: material handling equipment. It was around 2.4 in 2016, spiked to 3.7 in 2023, and is back to 2.85 now — up, down, and clearly different in shape from the three rising lines above. The original post doesn't mention this line; we read it off the chart ourselves.

The second chart looks at the other side of the same coin: orders already placed but not yet shipped by factories — "unfilled orders."

Unfilled orders for computers and electronic products, 1993 to 2026
Unfilled orders for computers and electronic products (including semiconductors). The 2016 low was about 104; there's a step-change up in 2023, and the latest June reading is 157.4. For context, the dot-com era peak was 133. Data from LSEG Datastream and Yardeni Research.

A growing pile of unfilled orders usually means demand is outstripping supply. But there's an ambiguity: it could be factories getting stuck, or demand simply too big to handle. To separate those two, you need a different metric.

The backlog would take about six months to clear — but that number has barely budged since 2024

Here's the metric that separates them: the backlog ratio. Unfilled orders divided by monthly shipments, with the result expressed in "months."

Backlog ratio = unfilled orders ÷ monthly shipments 5.7 months Each block = one month's worth of shipments It means: at current shipping rates, clearing the entire backlog takes 5.7 months ⛔ It does NOT mean "each customer waits 5.7 months from order to delivery" A 100-person line sounds scary, but if the restaurant turns 80 tables an hour, the queue clears in about an hour. The backlog ratio measures exactly that "time to clear."
Our diagram of the backlog ratio's formula and the common misreading. The 5.7 figure comes from the official chart below.

Applied back to the data:

Backlog ratio for electrical equipment manufacturing, with the NY Fed Global Supply Chain Pressure Index
The green area is the backlog ratio (left axis, in months), now around 5.7–5.8 months. It peaked at about 7.1 in fall 2022 and has been stuck between 5.5 and 6 since 2024. The orange dashed line is the NY Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI, right axis; readings show how many standard deviations above normal, so 1 means one typical fluctuation's worth of tightness). It was near 0 in 2024–2025 and has recently jumped to about +1.8. Data from the Census Bureau's M3 survey (NAICS 3353, electrical equipment manufacturing) and the New York Fed.

GSCPI is an index the New York Fed builds from shipping costs, delivery delays, and similar data. The reading tells you how many standard deviations above normal things are. The two lines on this chart are telling different stories:

Two lines, two stories

The backlog ratio says: high, but essentially unchanged for three years — that's persistently strong demand, not a sudden supply chain breakdown. GSCPI says: global supply chains are genuinely tightening, to nearly twice a normal fluctuation. a16z's call is that the global supply chain problems are real, but whether any of it has specifically hit data center gear isn't visible in this data.

⚠️ The two charts use different statistical bases. The backlog ratio chart covers electrical equipment manufacturing (NAICS 3353); the earlier unfilled orders chart covers computers and electronic products. You can put them side by side, but you can't stitch them into a single series.

Three of four import categories hold steady; only power conversion gear is down about 20%

The third lead is physical imports. The Census Bureau counts both dollars and units, so you can separate "money spent" from "goods received." If supply chains were truly jammed, the unit counts should drop.

Four panels of data center power and cooling imports
Imports of four categories of data center power and cooling equipment, indexed to Jan 2025 = 100. In each panel, the blue line is import value and the dashed line is physical units. Power conversion: units down to ~77, value up to ~128. Power distribution: value ~140, units ~110. Chillers and heat exchangers: value ~130, units ~90. IT cooling fans: value ~107, units ~97. Data from Census Bureau international trade data.

Only power conversion stands out: units down more than 20%, while dollars spent are up more than 20%. The other three categories all have latest unit readings between 90 and 110, roughly the same as last January. There's real month-to-month noise — low of 64, high of 126 — but no sustained downward drift. So conversion gear may genuinely be stuck, and everything else is basically unchanged.

Here's the question this data can't answer: how much higher would imports have been without supply chain friction? The original post acknowledges this itself.

~2x
AC and refrigeration machinery orders vs. 2016–2020 levels (≈3.8 → ≈7.1)
157.4
Unfilled orders index, June reading; the early-2000s peak was 133
5.7 mo
Time to clear the entire backlog at current shipping rates

All three leads point the same way: orders doubled over a decade, backlogs are running at 5.7 months, and import volumes haven't fallen. Everyone is more eager to buy than to sell. Whether supply chains are adding their own friction, none of these three can say. But there's zero sign of cooling demand in this batch of data.

Another issue from the same column we've covered
a16z Report: Software Stocks Are Being Sold, but the Market Is Only Killing the Half Without a Moat
The July 17 issue applied the same playbook to the software stock split, plus entry-level jobs and data center power use.
Jobs

Entry-level roles are scarce, but AI isn't the main culprit — remote work is

a16z has argued before that AI is currently creating more jobs than it destroys. But they concede one persistent weak spot: entry-level roles are hard to find. This issue's new observation is that entry-level tech jobs have always been a small slice of the pie, and that slice has barely budged in years.

Entry-level tech jobs were never a big slice of the pie

Share of U.S. job postings by seniority level, Q1 2026
Share of U.S. job postings by occupation, Q1 2026, sorted from highest to lowest entry-level share. Home health and personal care tops the list at about 91% entry-level; the national average is about 46%; software development is dead last, with entry-level around 4%, mid-level about 26%, and senior about 70%. Data from Indeed Hiring Lab (July 23).

This chart is easy to misread: it measures "within each occupation, what share of postings are entry-level," not "entry-level jobs as a share of the whole market." The software development row means that about one in twenty-five postings in that field is labeled entry-level.

What's actually being squeezed is mid-level; senior roles are still growing

Share of job postings by seniority, four industries, 2019 to 2025
2019–2025, annual average daily job postings by seniority, four industries. Tech: entry-level went from about 7.8% in 2019 to about 6.7% in 2025; mid-level fell from about 43% to about 36%; senior rose from about 48% to about 57%. Healthcare: entry-level fell from about 42% in 2019 to about 37% in 2025, and had been declining since 2021. Retail is stable at about 70% and food service about 80%. Data from Indeed Hiring Lab (July 23).

In the tech panel, that thin entry-level slice has barely moved in seven years. What's actually shifting is the middle: mid-level share is down about 7 points, and senior is up about 9 points. The squeeze is on people with a few years of experience who haven't reached senior yet.

⚠️ Another spot where text and chart disagree. The original post says "tech's entry-level is about 5%," but the chart shows tech's entry-level share between 6% and 8% across those seven years. The 4–5% number belongs to "software development" as a single occupation on the previous chart. These aren't the same thing, so we go with the chart.

If you want an industry where entry-level hiring genuinely is shrinking, healthcare fits better than tech: its entry-level base is large, and it's been falling steadily — about 44% in 2020 to about 37% in 2025. (The original post says "since 2023," but the chart shows the decline starting in 2021.)

Companies can now hire experienced people from anywhere in the world

The shares haven't moved, but young people do feel it's harder. The original post attributes that gap to remote hiring: a company no longer has to hire an inexperienced person locally.

U.S. long-distance hiring rate, 2018 to 2026
Long-distance hiring rate — the share of new hires who live far from the office and don't commute regularly. It hovered around 19% before the pandemic, started climbing in 2021, and has been steady above 26% since 2023. It hasn't come back down through 2026. The "26.4%" label on the chart corresponds to the April 2023 data point; the latest reading is around 26.3%. Data from ADP Research (July 15).

All the "return to office" mandates have been loud, but this line hasn't moved.

Share of workers in long-distance arrangements by industry, three points in time
Share of workers in long-distance arrangements by industry, at three points: Feb 2017, Feb 2020, Feb 2026. Information went from about 24% to about 28.5% to about 46.5%; professional, scientific, and technical services from about 23.5% to about 26.5% to about 45.5% (the chart highlights these two rows with orange arrows). The lowest category, accommodation and food service, is only about 18% in 2026. Data from ADP Research (July 16).

Nearly half of workers in those two industries are in some form of long-distance arrangement, almost double the pre-pandemic level. a16z itself calls the number "almost too high to believe," but the direction holds up to common sense.

AI probably didn't take your job. Remote work very likely did.

a16z Charts of the Week · Moses Sternstein
Spending

Real AI usage and enterprise spending remain strong — no signs of a bust

This is the most practical section: is the real money companies spend on AI shrinking? a16z's answer is no — but first they have to dismantle a widely misread indicator.

That "AI demand is collapsing" curve isn't actually measuring demand

SiliconData token cost index
SiliconData's Token Cost Index: about 1.00 in December, spiked to a peak of about 2.11 in mid-May, then fell steadily to a latest reading of 1.4520. The chart's title says "Token Cost Index," but the in-chart label says "Token Expenditure Index." Data from SiliconData.

This chart has been circulating online as "proof" that AI demand is about to collapse. But the index measures token expenditure intensity: how many tokens are being used and what each one costs, rolled into one number. It is not pure usage. ⚠️ SiliconData hasn't published the exact methodology, so we only know it's a function of both volume and price.

Same people, spending more money, index falling Last monthThis month Total spend up Average token price down Dark = expensive token spend Light = cheap token spend The index is pulled by both, so a falling index ≠ falling demand
Our diagram of why the expenditure intensity index can fall while total demand rises. Bar heights are illustrative, not real data.

In other words: expensive token usage is rising, cheap token usage is rising faster, and the average price per token gets dragged down. The index drifts lower while total spend is actually going up.

That's the mechanism. Whether it's happening right now, the original post can't say for sure. But another batch of data at least shows total spend is still climbing.

Combined spending on OpenAI, Anthropic, and Cursor by industry
Combined spending on OpenAI, Anthropic, and Cursor, by industry. Bars are monthly totals; lines are medians. Software industry totals went from about $480K/month to about $6.25M; medians from about $250 to about $5,800. Financials (red line) has the steepest recent median climb, to about $1,400. Business services: about $840; consumer: about $530. ⚠️ The caption itself flags three limitations: U.S.-only, possibly SMB-heavy, and OpenRouter covers only a small slice of overall demand. Data via YipitData from OpenRouter (a relay platform that forwards developer requests to various models), as of July 26, 2026.

Software spends the most — no surprise there. The outlier is financials: its median curve has turned the steepest in recent months, moving from behind business services to second place.

What's really rising: the price of renting a GPU

If the token index is an easy-to-misread metric, GPU rental prices are far more direct: if you want the card, you pay by the hour.

Neocloud GPU rental price index, weekly medians through 2026
Neocloud (small and mid-size cloud vendors that specialize in GPU rental, not the hyperscalers like AWS or Azure) rental price index, weekly medians so far in 2026. H100 went from about $2.15 per GPU-hour to about $2.68; A100 from about $1.32 to about $1.60; H200 only entered the chart in mid-May, from about $2.65 to about $3.01; B200 from about $4.32 to about $5.51, after touching about $5.92 in late March. Data from SiliconData.
⚠️ Another spot where text and chart disagree. The original post says "A100 spot prices have been pretty stable," but the chart shows A100 rising from about $1.25 to about $1.55 — up more than 20% — before flattening out. We go with the chart.

The other line is term pricing: locking in a one-year lease and price in advance. Spot reflects this week's tightness; the term rate embeds expectations for a year out.

H100 rental price term structure, five observation dates
H100 term rate curve. The x-axis is lease length (0 to 36 months); the y-axis is the all-in hourly rate locked in for that term; five lines are five observation dates. Look at the vertical dashed line at 12 months: Nov 22, 2025 at about $1.79/hr and Jul 28, 2026 at about $2.43/hr. Data from SiliconData, based on non-hyperscaler cloud providers.

Eight months, and the one-year lockup went from about $1.79 to about $2.43 — up about 35%. On the far left of the same chart (0 months, i.e., spot), the same period went from about $1.99 to about $2.76, up about 39%. Spot actually rose a bit more; both ends moved together. (The original post says "almost 40%," but based on the two points at 12 months on this chart, it's 35%.)

Kalshi prediction market on H100 compute prices
A market on Kalshi (a prediction market platform for betting on future events): whether H100 compute prices will be up or down by Friday. The comparison line is $2.73, and the market was pricing about a 65% chance of "above that line," with the price touching about $2.78 in late July. ⚠️ This market's total dollar volume from start to finish is just $1,342. With that little money at stake, treat it as a curiosity, not evidence. Data from Kalshi screenshot.

Taken together, this issue is really a demonstration of how to read data: take an alarming signal seriously, then go layer by layer to see if other data confirms it — and when you hit a wall, say so plainly. This batch of data shows no sign of demand cooling, but it only answers the "demand" question.

If you want to track this yourself: all 14 charts in this piece have their sources and statistical bases listed. The original post does the same for its own charts: U.S. Census Bureau M3 manufacturing survey and international trade data, NY Fed Global Supply Chain Pressure Index GSCPI, Indeed Hiring Lab, ADP Research, SiliconData's token index and Neocloud GPU prices, YipitData via OpenRouter, and Kalshi.
Source
Charts of the Week: Moar Machinesa16z · Moses Sternstein·a16z.news·2026-07-31
Our note
All 14 charts are from the original issue. We downloaded and self-hosted them with no cropping or edits. Values in the captions were read by us, chart by chart, calibrating against the axes. Where the text disagrees with the charts, we go with the charts and note it in place; six known instances: $3.27B is the quarterly total, not the increase; tech entry-level is 6–8%, not 5%; A100 spot is not "pretty stable"; the 26.4% long-distance hiring rate is the April 2023 label point; the 12-month H100 term rise is 35% per the chart, not "almost 40%"; and healthcare entry-level began falling in 2021, not 2023. The machinery orders chart doesn't label its y-axis units, so only relative changes are described. The $76M being 12% of Vertiv's $630M YoY increase is our calculation. The verification-chain diagram, the backlog ratio explainer, and the expenditure intensity index explainer are ours as well.
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